Calvinism vs. Arminianism - IV

Alex,

Phil Tallon here, from Appleseed Ministries. Very thoughtful posts. It's nice to read such constructive criticism. The C. v. A. often gets so ugly (on both sides) - so a bit of common courtesy is always pleasant.

If your readers are looking for another good example of intelligent, polite discourse, make sure they see our Calvinism Debate on eBay.

Two thoughts on your post:

1) You note that Dongell and Walls make the unwarranted assumption that God cannot have two levels of "wishing" regarding salvation, as you say, "whereby He simultaneously desires that all be saved (I Tim. 2:4), but decrees that not all receive electing love (Rom. 9:20-24)".

You are right that Walls and Dongell oppose this kind of wishing, but they don't deny the general idea of "two wills" within God - do they?

I say this because most Christian theologians assume that God might desire all to be saved, but still allow some to be damned - whether because of the 'greater good' of free will, or God's glory, or whatever. The “two wills” position is actually pretty common on both sides of the fence.

Thus, I'm just a little puzzled by your inclusion of this as an "unwarranted assumption" as the first part of the assumption (that God has two wills), Walls and Dongell would probably accept, and the second part (that God decrees some to be damned) is substantially covered in their third 'unwarranted assumption.'

Let me know what you think.

2) Anyway, the second question I wanted to raise has to do with your assumption that Walls and Dongell "distort the Scriptures by reading these philosophical commitments into the biblical texts".

I've got a lot of Reformed friends and they raise this issue with me - accusing me of not taking scripture seriously - but it often seems like they are being a bit naive about the way that their own assumptions affect the way they read scripture.

I notice you reference scripture quite often, which is good, but sometimes seem to assume that scripture already carries with it the meaning which is, in fact, in question. For instance, you write:

"the doctrine of election, properly understood, is a comfort to Christians (Rom. 8:28-30)"

I agree with this, but since the nature of the doctrine of election is the very thing that Walls and Dongell are arguing about, it seems a bit silly to reference a verse in Romans this way. You're just assuming that your version of election is what Paul is operating with when he offers these words of comfort.

Taking an analogous example, let us assume that the character of George Washington is being attacked by a revisionist historian, who calls Washington a pathological liar. It would be silly for me to attempt to refute this historian by quoting Washington, who (reportedly) said, "I can never tell a lie". In this case I would be trying to use as evidence the very evidence which is under discussion.

I find this use of scripture to be a bit common in Calvinistic circles, as the meaning of "election" is often interpreted through the writings of Calvin, and thus Reformed readers perhaps too hastily assume that their initial understanding of scripture is the most likely. When I read Ephesians 1:5, for instance, it is easy to read "predestined" in a Westminster Confession sort of way. But many others, such as Karl Barth, have read such verses in significantly different ways which do not imply unconditional election.

Anyway, returning to Walls and Dongell's philosophical frameworks... Couldn’t one argue that Walls and Dongell simply allow the scriptural description of divine ‘agape’ to guide their interpretation of scripture? I take it that you assume that we must often interpret scriptures in light of other scriptures - we do assign priorities.

Since the bible describes God as agape, and describes the shape of this agape (not proud, not self seeking, etc.), mightn’t we Arminians lay claim to an equally biblical hermeneutic?

Why must the Arminian position be driven by philosophical commitments, when I take the most fundamental objection to Calvinism (that God isn’t behaving lovingly by damning with determinism) to be based on a fully biblical picture of divine love presented in scripture itself.

Iron to Iron, Sharpen Back.

philip.tallon@gmail.com

Philip,

Thanks for the very illuminating questions.

On #1, I see what you are saying. In fact, in the last paragraph of my paper, I acknowledge that Walls/Dongell do have two levels of "wishing". I note: "For Walls and Dongell, God’s will to save all is restrained by the higher good of relationships with God only possible via human self-determination." What I'm trying to say in what I call their first unwarranted assumption is that (I believe) Walls/Dongell think God wanting everyone to be saved is self-contradictory in a compatabilistic model, whereby God could irresistibly draw all to Himself--in such a manner that they themselves want to come to Him. Since Arminians don't think God works that way (because of His commitment to the kind of relationships that are only possible if people exercise libertarian freedom), for them God having "two levels of wishing" is not a "logical show-stopper". But (and correct me if I'm wrong), from an Arminian perspective, Calvinists ought not to say "God wants everyone to be saved" because, in fact, He doesn't irresistibly woo everyone (as He does the elect). So Arminians think we (Calvinists) have a "logical show-stopper." And I'm saying that THIS assumption is unwarranted. [I probably could have worded this more clearly in my paper. Thanks for pointing it out.]

On #2, I do think we all come to the texts with presuppositions. And we all have to wrestle with interpreting Scripture with Scripture. And I would also admit that there are a few texts which, upon first glance, seem to argue for an Arminian position. However, I am convinced (as a former staunch Arminian) that the number of "clear Calvinistic texts" far outweigh the "potentially Arminian texts" and that the latter, upon analysis, end up supporting the Calvinist view as well.

I too think God is love. He is a Savior at heart. He delights to show Himself strong for those who trust Him. But I also take human depravity seriously. None seek God; all are opposed to Him. God truly could have allowed all to perish. His mercy and grace are thus free (meaning, unconstrained --he was under no obligation to extend it). That is the essence of grace. Further, I think unconditional election is consistent with the wisdom of God that none should boast in having made the right choice.

When I say Arminianism is driven by philosophical commitments, what I mean is this: I think Arminianism is more intuitive and believable for many people, perhaps especially so in a western democratic country. Arminianism tells me I can do something to be saved: believe in Jesus Christ and start following Him as my Lord. I like that -- it puts the ball in my court, and tells me I have a shot at it. As sinners, we want to think that we bring something to the table--our ability to choose. Calvinism utterly decimates this concept by telling me that I had nothing more to do with my second birth than I did with my first. The cries of life my daughter made when she was born are like the faith and repentance of a regenerated person: signs of life. They in no way contribute to that life--her mom and dad did that (of course, in God's providence).

Thanks for the helpful post; feel free to post anytime.

Alex

Alex,

Thanks for your insightful reply.

On Point #1) I don't know about Dongell and Walls, but I think the "two wills" theory works okay for Calvinists. Or, at least, it isn't a "logical show stopper".

Really, a two wills account is helpful anytime you have multiple levels of value, which can be in conflict.

For Free-Willists, the higher value is uncompelled, loving relationship, which outweighs the suffering of those who reject God freely. For Calvinists, the greater good of God's glory outweighs the suffering of the damned. I think you make this point in your paper, actually.

So I wouldn't say that there's anything 'illogical' about a two-wills position under a Calvinistic account.

My critique of Calvinists saying "God wants everyone to be saved" is not that their being illogical, but just that the statement isn't all that significant.

It's kind of like saying to my Mom, "I wish I could be at your birthday party, but I need to go shoe-shopping with my wife, instead." In this case, I clearly have two wills, but I obviously do not wish very strongly to go to my mother's birthday party, since even the smallest consideration keeps me from going.

Thus, I guess I'd say that the Calvinists two wills account isn't illogical - it just isn't all that compelling.

On Point # 2) I hear what you are saying, but I still don't really like the term 'philosophical commitments' here. It seems to assume there is an inherent contradiction between philosophy and theology (which I deny).

Philosophical commitments (strictly speaking) are just part of human thinking. We all need them. So really every argument is driven by philosophical commitments.

I think what you are really saying is that Arminianism is driven by 'secular' philosophical commitments. Here I disagree, but I understand where you are coming from. Our society is obsessed with personal liberty and seeks to defend it at every turn.

But the fact that free-willism shares some features with secular society does nothing to tarnish its reputation. One doesn't want to commit the 'genetic fallacy' after all. Just because the Greeks loved architecture AND sodomy does not mean that architecture is as sinful as sodomy.

Plus, one could fairly easily argue the other way, that our society is also shot through with a sense of being determined by our environment, genetics or upbringing. And thus Calvinism appeals to young people today who feel as if they lack the ability to affect change in their own lives.

Since both views on the will predate modern genetics or modern democracy, I doubt that either culprit is largely responsible for our differences in belief.

Thus I don’t think that the problem with Walls and Dongell (and me) is that we have too many philosophical commitments which cloud our understanding of scripture. We rely on philosophical commitments to read books, communicate with others, build houses, and tell jokes.

Obviously some of our commitments are incorrect. Often we have to modify and reverse things that we once thought were true. But our most basic commitments rarely change.

Some philosophical commitments, for instance, are more fundamental than the teachings of scripture - and we shouldn’t do away with them. On a fundamental level, if scripture told me that 2 + 2 = 5, I could not honestly believe this. Given the choice between trusting a book and trusting my basic beliefs, I have to stick to my basic beliefs.

Moral beliefs can be like this as well. As a person raised in a loving home, by caring parents, it just seems fundamental to me that when you love someone you want the best for them, and do what you can to promote their ultimate flourishing.

Indeed, it is hard to think of a more basic moral insight than this. We often feel a deep sense of anger at those who abuse their own children, for whatever reason. As far as I can see, loving someone means desiring the best for them.

If a theological position contradicts this most basic moral insight, then I am forced to look for an alternative position.

Calvinism seems to contradict this fundamental philosophical commitment to promote the ultimate flourishing of those we love. Perhaps God has other reasons why he cannot promote everyone’s flourishing, but gaining glory for himself does not, for me, work as an explanation.

This God just doesn’t seem to be all-loving. Fortunately there are alternate accounts of divine grace. So I don’t have to abandon faith in the Christian God.

But if the Calvinist account, as you lay it out, were really the only live option for Christian theology, I think I would rather not be a Christian. Perhaps this sounds a bit strong, but I think that some philosophical commitments cannot be dispensed with.

Without being too flippant, I’ll just close by saying that if God doesn’t love my wife, children, or family members enough to offer then the real possibility of salvation, then I’d rather not worship such a God. Another commitment of mine is that only the greatest possible being deserves worship. And a God who didn’t love perfectly would be worthy of praise and worship songs.

Though I don’t know what else I’d do on Sunday mornings. Maybe I’d go shoe-shopping with my wife.

Phillip,
Those are incredibly strong words, and I would encourage you to perhaps speak in different terms than by declaring what kind of God you would or would not prefer to worship when you have absolutely no say in the kind of God who simply is, like it or not. I hear more and more Arminians talking like that these days, and I would just caution you as a fellow Christian since this kind of talk it does not seem beneficial to anyone.

Now regarding your notion of "basic moral insights," do we really want to make an antithesis between our "basic moral insights" and what the Bible says? If they are actually "moral" insights, then they will fit with what the Bible says, for where do we derive our notion of what is "moral" apart from God's word? And if these "basic moral insights" of ours do not match up with the Bible, then I am going to have to say that the Bible takes precedence above my own fallen intuitions (for the Bible itself teaches me not to trust my own moral intuitions, they have not done me much good).

Regarding your notion of "perfect love," which you make the requisite for God to have in order for you to worship him, I'm just wondering how you are defining this term, since one could argue that even in your Arminian view God does not have "perfect love." We might define "perfect love" as "doing what is best for someone in as much as you have the capability to do so." Under this definition and your Arminian view, God does not have "perfect love" for humanity in that, according to the biblical testimony of the existence of hell, God has not done everything he possibly could to do what is best for every person (with "what is best" equaling that person's living forever in heaven with God, and not suffering in hell). So, apparently, even in your view, something is more important to God than "loving perfectly"--namely, God's allowing every person to have freewill. At this point, you may want to modify the definition I gave above (drawing on your own) for "perfect love" by adding that it must also include something about God not overriding a person's freewill in order to do what's best for them. But must this really be taken into account? Consider the analogy of a father running into a burning house to save his son who is trapped in his bedroom. The father finally makes it to him, but as he is picking him up in his arms the child yells out, "No! I don't want to go, I want to stay here!" Now what is the most "perfectly loving" thing for the father to do in this situation? 1. To disregard the son's statement and rescue him out of the burning house anyway, since the father knows that that is what is best for him. 2. To honor his request and leave him to be burned alive.
It is very hard for me to think of #2 as "perfect love."

Jesse Peterson

Jesse,

Thanks for your reply.

By the way, Alex, if you want, we can move this conversation to somewhere else (such as my blog). I don't want to dominate your comment section.

Anyway, it seems to me that there are three elements of your argument here.

1) The first question is whether Arminians should “draw the line in the sand” with Calvinists. Should we say that a God who ‘damns with determinism’ is unworship-able?

Perhaps my language above is a bit too strong in saying so, but it isn't hasty.

Partly, my goal here is to say that I find the conclusions of Calvinism ultimately untenable. By saying that such a God is not lovable, though, I'm trying to be a bit nicer in my phrasing than saying, "Your theology stinks" or some other vitriolic response. Just like you might say "No thanks, I'm not hungry", when your Swedish Grandmother offers you a piece of pickled herring, instead of saying "This is disgusting."

But getting back to the point. I think there is theological warrant for deeming certain ‘Gods’ unworship-able. Anselm defines God as "That than which nothing greater can be thought", and the perfect being tradition decrees that only that which is perfect is worthy of worship.

Thus Christians have often written off certain views of God as unacceptable for Christian faith. Quite recently the ETS was embroiled in controversy over Open Theism, and at least part of the controversy centered around whether the Openness God is a perfect being. Therefore, Bruce Ware’s book, “Their God is Too Small” makes a similar point in that it tries to expose the Open-ness God as deficient, and not worthy of trust.

So I do think there is a place for some “line-drawing” in our theological discussions. Of course, line-drawing is not the same as bridge-burning. I don’t want to do the latter.

2) The second question is whether our basic moral commitments are worth anything when compared with scripture. I said above that we have to rely on our basic beliefs (such as self-evident truths like 2+2=4 or incorrigible beliefs like ‘The sky looks blue’). Really basic ‘Moral and Value commitments’ are kind of like this in that we really can’t overturn them. It just seems that it is better to me to experience pleasure rather than pain. It just seems to me that it is better to love people rather than to be mean to them. No book which said otherwise could dissuade me of this - even a really special book.

Of course, the Bible says nothing which contradicts my most basic moral and axiological commitments. So I’m not drawing any grand antithesis between my morality and God’s morality. My antithesis only exists if Calvinism is true. Which, in my view, it isn’t.

Yet the Bible does shape, correct and contradict many of my moral beliefs. Once I thought that a little lying wasn’t so bad, but the Bible set me straight on this. It showed me that I was wrong. But even when I am being ‘set straight’ by scripture (which happens often), there is still an element of ‘recognition’ which happens, where I realize that the Bible’s higher truth is the perfection of something which was present from the beginning.

C. S. Lewis talks about this in “The Problem of Pain”, the chapter on ‘Divine Goodness’, where he notes, “If God’s moral judgment differs from ours so that our ‘black’ may be His ‘white’ we can mean nothing by calling him good.”

What Lewis is saying here, is that for the term goodness to have content for us, then we must have some sense of what goodness means, even if our sense is painfully limited and often twisted. Thus, when we encounter the good news more and more in scripture, there must be a way in which we recognize it as ‘good’. Though it is often painful news, breaking us our of our comfortable selfishness, when we do see the truth, some small part of us welcomes it.

Thus, when you read “for God so loved the world” I assume that you have some inkling of what love means when you come to the text. Likewise, in order to understand any of scripture we have to have a pre-existing set of beliefs which act as a framework. If all of the moral values we found in scripture we simply alien to us, how could we comprehend the book at all?

3) On to the third point. You asked about my definition of ‘perfect goodness’ - and I don’t have one. But I did say that, at the basic level, love entails “wanting the best for people, and doing what you can to promote their ultimate flourishing”.

Assuming free will, does hell contradict the idea that God desires the best for us? I don’t think it necessarily does.

You bring up the example of a father and a child in the burning house as one case where it is good to over-ride free will, in order to promote the child’s flourishing. On the whole, this is a silly example. We override the choices of our children all the time in order to foster their growth.

But with adult children a father may well allow a child to exercise their freedom in destructive ways. If your adult child is an alcoholic, you might allow them to continue drinking, instead of forcibly putting them in rehab for the fourth time. In this case, a father might say that it is better to allow a child to freely harm themselves then to be forcibly healthy. As Augustine says, “A weeping man is better than a happy worm”.

Hell works along similar lines, as a loving God might say that it is more loving to freely allow people to reject Him than to forcibly cause them to love Him. Yet, it is not as if God necessitates misery for those who reject Him, misery simply follows from sin by necessity. There is no happiness apart from God. Or, as George MacDonald says, the only happiness God has to offer is Himself.

It seems to me that it is better to give humans some degree of autonomy. Thus, free will is a way of promoting the human flourishing, as it enables us to respond to God’s gracious love out of a reciprocal, uncompelled love. It is this uncompelled response which IS the best that God lovingly desires, and thus allows the possibility of rejecting this ‘best option.’

Phil,

You (and all others) are welcome to keep commenting here. I appreciate the civility in tone with which we are discussing these matters.

Alex

Phil,
1) Yes, line-drawing is sometimes necessary. But when you are saying that the God of a great number of Christians (including the God of such Christians throughout history as Martin Luther, John Calvin, and Jonathan Edwards) is actually an "un-worshipable" god, that is some severe line-drawing. You are saying the God of the Arminian is so different a God from the God of the Calvinist that there is no longer any common point of worship. It is simply a different God. If this is the case I have no idea how we are to continue to discuss these things for the edification of the Body. It might as well be a discussion between Christians and Muslims. Do we really want to say the Arminianism vs. Calvinism debate is of that same nature? For the record, while I am 100% convinced of the truth of the Calvinistic view of God in Scripture, if the Arminian view were right, I am still dealing with a God who created me, and to whom I owe all my existence as well as salvation in Christ, and who is therefore incredibly worthy of all the worship I can muster.

2) It is interesting to make a statement beginning with the words "it just seems...," to then proceed to give something of your experience, and then finally to say that the very Word of God could not possibly trump would "just seems" to be true from your life experience, WERE they to ever be opposed. I'm not sure from where you gain such incredible confidence in that which merely "just seems" to be true for you. Call me pessimistic, but I do not find my personal experience to be so reliable!

The elephant in the room regarding this discussion of "basic moral committment" (or whatever we are calling it) is this question: "But from where is such a basic moral committment ORIGINALLY DERIVED?" And this is where I would want to affirm that any 'basic moral committments' that you may think you have apart from God or Scripture are indeed granted to you from these same things: 1) Through the natural law God has written upon the human heart, though I agree very much with you that this has been tainted and distorted by the Fall, and thus most people don't even recognize it. 2) Through the Word of God as it has been passed on through culture and generations. I mean by this that you learned when you were a kid that killing is wrong, and you learned that from your parents (probably), who learned it from a cultural which was (at least on that note) reflecting its Judeo-Christian moral heritage. In this way biblical values were passed on, and that's a huge part of whence you obtained this sense that killing is wrong.

So while I do see what you are saying with the Lewis quote and so forth, that there needs to be some "recognition" factor in ascribing to God the adjective "good" in order for the word to have any meaning to us in relation to God, I would nevertheless posit that this 'intrinsic' understanding we may have regarding what "good" is, is only given to us by God himself (either through 1 or 2 above) and thus cannot possibly speak of any kind of "good" other than the "good" that God really is.

We are really pressing on the Euthyphro question here: Is there any higher moral standard/rule to which even God himself must comply? And my answer to that would be, "Absolutely not." This is because the Triune God himself DEFINES all moral value by his very moral beauty. Morality is rooted in God himself, not something outside of God that God is "tapping into."

Furthermore, you write, "If all of the moral values we found in scripture we simply alien to us, how could we comprehend the book at all?" Indeed, this is why so many can't! And I think this is why Paul calls the gospel "foolishness" to those who are perishing. God sending his Son to die on a cross for the sins of mankind? What rubbish! So they think. Further, this is why I (as a Calvinist) believe that the message of the gospel only becomes wise and beautiful to a person when "God, who said 'Let light shine out darkness' shines in our hearts to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ" (2 Cor. 4:6). That is why every act of belief in Christ is a miracle of God.

3) I don't understand why you call my father and child example a silly one. Your only modification was to make the child a grown-up. But I can give the same example in that scenario. Let's say it is not the man's child trapped in the house but rather his wife. And she says the same thing the child does when he gets to her, out of fear or panic. I know of no man on earth who would let his wife be burned alive just because she said she wanted to be. (Notice, by the way, that this is the assumption of the laws of our land against euthynasia and suicide. The person's will is irrelevant and the objective good holds sway). Also, in the example I originally gave, the purpose of the father overriding the child's will was not at all to "foster his grown," but simply to save his life. That's the issue.

Regarding your examples of allowing an adult child to go his own way (respecting his freedom), people only do that if they think it is the only way to ULTIMATELY bring about the person's best welfare, such as in the person hitting bottom and finally coming to their senses and being restoreed. But no decent person "respects the freedom" of another if they really think it will cause the person to destroy him/herself irrevocably. That would simply not be love. The highest act of love is to do for another person what he cannot do for himself. That is what Christ did on the Cross. And that is what God does for us when he grants us the gift of repentance and faith (cf. Acts 11:18 – “They glorified God saying, ‘Then to the Gentiles also God has granted repentance that leads to life.”).

It seems that we are coming to a stale mate, but I simply do not find convincing the idea that God's universal Highest Good is the freedom of will of humans, even if that freedom entails their suffering in hell forever (where, Scripture is clear, God will be pouring wrath upon them (read Revel.)).

In my (and, I believe, the Bible’s) scenario, God's highest good is indeed to be glorified by his Bride, those who are able to see the untold depths of his Mercy so much more clearly because of the contrast made when they see what God's Justice demands--eternal wrath in hell. Apart from God's justice, his mercy would mean nothing to us. And it is God's will that the saints would forever be "to the praise of his glorious grace, with which he has blessed us in the Beloved" (Eph. 1:6).

In sum, I would encourage you, Phil, to not begin with your ‘moral commitments’ and then move from there to the Bible. But rather begin with that the text actually says, and form your moral commitments from there. In doing so you may just find that a glorious, sovereign God is a great cause for joy: “The Lord reigns! Let the earth rejoice!” (Ps. 97:1).

Jesse

Jesse,

Thanks for your reply.

I think we might be running in circles a bit regarding "moral commitments" - my fault, no doubt, for not being more clear about the nature of these basic beliefs and how they are necessary for human cognition. As well as how they are, in fact, derived from God whether naturally or supernaturally, generally or specially.

By way of reply, I'll just say that no matter where we assume these commitments come from, we still have to rely on them. Whether we believe, for instance, that the laws of logic come from God, we still assume that logic works. So, in this specific argument, it is actually irrelevant where our most moral commitments come from. What matters is that we have to trust them or else we will not be able to trust our most basic interaction with the world.

Thus, we assume that non-Christians can comprehend much of scripture when it speaks of love, repentance, God, goodness and the like. Of course they cannot understand the depths of God's loving mercy. The cross can be 'foolishness' to Pagans, without Christian love being 'nonsense' to them. Thus, when I speak of moral intuitions, I mean the kind of general understanding almost all humans have of right and wrong, love and hate, etc.

Does this clear things up?

As for the 'silly example'. I think the difference between letting your wife burn to death, and letting an adult son continue in his alcoholism (after many attempts to help him) is significant.

As for your discussion of free will, I find it interesting how much you sound like me.

Drawing a line in the sand, you seem to place the God of the Free-Willists outside the realm of decency, by appealing to moral intuitions of decency:

But no decent person "respects the freedom" of another if they really think it will cause the person to destroy him/herself irrevocably. That would simply not be love. The highest act of love is to do for another person what he cannot do for himself. That is what Christ did on the Cross. And that is what God does for us when he grants us the gift of repentance and faith (cf. Acts 11:18 – “They glorified God saying, ‘Then to the Gentiles also God has granted repentance that leads to life.”).

I grant that you quote scripture, but the above verse is neutral on the question at hand, and thus the real center of your argument is found when you say: "That would simply not be love."

If indeed you are appealing to a moral intuition here (albeit, one shaped by scripture), then it seems like we are now in the same boat, seeking to understand God's providence by using (at least partially) our God-given sense of what love means.

If this is the case, then I think we can begin to discuss this question seriously.

Hi Alex

I appreciate your helpful article on the Calvinism vs Arminianism debate. The discussion here has also been an interesting and, as mentioned, a nicely civil one.

I also have been writing on this topic for several months now, in a series on my blog.

I agree with your paper's position that the Arminian view demonstrates certain philosophical commitments which lead to its conclusions.

For example, the idea that if God has indeed sovereignly chosen certain people for election unto salvation, and not chosen certain others, He would be thus be unloving or "the author of sin".

Another common assumption expressed in Arminian arguments is the idea that since God has commanded people everywhere to repent of sin, or says things like "Whoever believes in Christ will be saved", that people must therefore have in themselves the ability to repent or believe in Christ.However such is not a Scripture based conclusion.

I think when the Calvinist reads Scripture and sees, for example, Paul in Romans 9 clearly saying that God's choices in election are based upon His mercy and compassion and not conditioned upon human actions, he/she concludes that such a scheme of election is loving, righteous and fair, knowing that God Himself is all of those things.

It seems however that the Arminian position looks at such a passage, and in order to maintain its philosophical commitments must re-interpret the meaning of Paul's bold statements. Thus for example, they argue that Paul is not talking about individual salvation at all in Romans 9. For them, Paul simply cannot mean what he is saying here-- that God chooses to have compassion on some, and harden others.

But isn't the underlying Arminian assumption here, one which leads them to reject the idea of unconditional election that I think is stated in this chapter, that God owes salvation to man? Or that a God of love must do everything possible to save everyone? But if God does not owe salvation to anyone, because all have sinned, and if He holds us responsible for sin despite the fact that He is sovereign over everything that happens (as Scripture shows), then His showing mercy to some but not others is not unjust. it would only be unfair for God to deny salvation if we deserved salvation.

The Bible describes God's sovereignty as such that people are held responsible for the evil they do despite God's absolute control over all events, and that He works even the evil acts of men into His wise plan.

Phil, you wrote:

... "no matter where we assume these commitments come from, we still have to rely on them. Whether we believe, for instance, that the laws of logic come from God, we still assume that logic works. So, in this specific argument, it is actually irrelevant where our most moral commitments come from. What matters is that we have to trust them or else we will not be able to trust our most basic interaction with the world.

Thus, we assume that non-Christians can comprehend much of scripture when it speaks of love, repentance, God, goodness and the like. Of course they cannot understand the depths of God's loving mercy. The cross can be 'foolishness' to Pagans, without Christian love being 'nonsense' to them. Thus, when I speak of moral intuitions, I mean the kind of general understanding almost all humans have of right and wrong, love and hate, etc."

I agree that people have God-given conscience and can know right from wrong, but I'm not sure that Christian love isn't indeed nonsense to the non-believer-- particularly as the essence of God's/Christian love is the death of Christ on the cross (foolishness to those who are perishing). The question is where does my definition of love come from-- my own moral intuition, my "God-given sense", or, from the Bible? Scripture is the Truth. My intuition therefore is only correct to the degree that it coincides with Scripture.

If then Scripture teaches that God is love; that a loving God created Hell and will justly punish evil doers there; and that He will rescue those whom He has chosen from the wrath that is to come, but will leave others to their just deserts, then perhaps my definition of love must be expanded/altered to fit with these biblical facts.

Blessings,

Alex Jordan

One issue that is often overlooked in the discussion concerning God's two wills and what is meant when it says he loves someone is the very nature of revelation. in an e-mail/phone conversation with a friend of mine we came up with the following:

Revleation assumes that words communicate certian content.

The issue is a matter of whether God has reliably revealed himself, and even whether words have identifiable meanings. The word "love" is pretty clear in its core meaning, especially agape love, and you simply have to engage in extreme
equivocation to say God loves people whose true flourishing he does not promote.

That is why in I John, Christians are urged to promote the well being of people to demonstrate true love, as opposed to using the word but
doing nothing to promote their well being. Such love, moreover is a reflection of Jesus Christ laying down his life for us, which is the ultimate way we know what love is (I John 3:16-20).

Consider this example. I would say God cannot lie anymore than he can fail to be truly loving to all people. Could God perform actions that we would consider lies from our normal understanding of the term and still be true?

Suppose in the end he condemned to hell those who believe in Jesus, to take an extreme example. Would you defend this by saying "I cannot tell God what being true, and never lying must mean"?

Could God possibly do this? If so, we have fallen into a sort of linguistic or hermeneutical nihilism.
If not, then I wonder why you would take a stronger stand on the core meaning of truth than you do on love.

I've never heard a thoughtful Reformed thinker tackle this question in any remotely satisfactory way and would love to hear your thoughts.

Hi,

I realize this post is almost a year old, but I wanted to respond to some of the ideas about God’s love posted here.

I am a Calvinist who used to be an Arminian. As an Arminian, I was faced with the criticism that Arminianism is driven by philosophical presuppositions, instead of being driven by Scripture. Eventually, that was one of the reasons I became a Calvinist.

Indeed, every Arminian needs to eventually face this question: Is Scripture the final authority for me in all matters of faith and morals or not? Am I going to let Scripture define its own terms (as much as it is possible for my feeble mind, of course), or am I going to dictate what it must say? Unfortunately, some of those commenting here have already, by their own admission, chosen the latter to some extend.

As to the matter of God’s love, I did not find Arminianism to provide the answers its proponents claim for it. For example:
1. Arminianism does not solve the problem of evil. Since God knows the future, all He has to do is create only those whom He knows before hand will believe in Him freely (in the libertarian sense). Indeed, if love is defined as some have defined it here, then God must not be loving, for He knowingly chose to create those whom He knew would end up in Hell. I don’t see any way of escaping that conclusion, unless: (a) one says that free will implies disobedience (is not Christ both sinless and free?), or (b) one denies God’s omniscience (Open Theism).
2. Arminianism seems to imply that God did not have a choice in giving His only begotten Son. But Jesus did not have to die for our sins. Salvation is by grace alone. Since when is a gift required? I would venture to say that most Arminians believe Jesus did not die for demons. There was no plan of redemption for them. If that’s the case, then Scripture clearly contradicts this idea that God must attempt to save everyone.
3. Arminianism seems to imply that God must do everything possible to save everyone. But Scripture says otherwise. For example, Jesus said “Woe to you, Chorazin! Woe to you, Bethsaida! For if the mighty works done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes.” (Matthew 11:21, ESV). Jesus appeared to a murderous Saul on the road to Damascus, but we have no word that He appeared to a murderous Caiaphas. He appeared to doubting Thomas, but not to other doubters throughout history. And then there is Romans 9.

Finally, I don’t find at all compelling this notion that love implies God must save everyone. Even in the Arminian system something is more important than the well-being of the creature (i.e., free will). Besides, I don’t believe God loves everyone the same way. He loves those whom He calls His children (John 1:12) more than those who are not (John 8:44, Psalms 2:4, Romans 9:8-24).

God bless,

Nick